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AWAKENING THE PRESS CLAUSE
Sonja R. West

*

The Free Press Clause enjoys less practical significance than almost any other
constitutional provision. While recognizing the structural and expressive importance
of a free press, the U.S. Supreme Court does not explicitly recognize any right or
protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause. Recently in the Court’s
Citizens United decision, Justices Stevens and Scalia reignited the thirty-yearold debate over whether the Press Clause has any function separate from the
Speech Clause.
The primary roadblock to recognizing independent meaning in the Press Clause
is the definitional problem—who or what is the “press” in the First Amendment?
Others have attempted to define the press, but the ubiquitous instinct toward
constitutional overprotection tends to invite overly broad definitions that include
potentially everyone. Proponents of these overinclusive definitions attempt to transfer
our constitutionally overprotective approach from the Speech Clause to the Press
Clause. The net result has been, ironically, fewer constitutional press rights rather
than more.
This Article endeavors to break that cycle by arguing that the way to give
long-overdue meaning to this important piece of constitutional text is to embrace
press exceptionalism and a narrow definition of the press. By adopting an overly
protective approach to the Press Clause, we have been sucked into a constitutional
feedback loop: An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap
between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause.
Awakening the Press Clause, therefore, requires embracing a definition of the press
that is sufficiently narrow. This Article furthermore submits that the definitional
problem is manageable because line-drawing perfectionism is not required thanks
to the fallback protections of the Speech Clause.
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In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little difficulty
1
knowing a journalist when it sees one.

INTRODUCTION
Buried in the separate opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
183-page campaign finance case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis2
sion is a rarely seen tussle between two justices over one of the U.S.
Constitution’s most overlooked mysteries—whether the Press Clause has
independent significance. Arguing in favor of free speech rights for corporations, Justice Scalia pointed out that most newspapers are corporations and
yet the thought that newspapers “have free-speech rights only at the sufferance
3
of Congress[ ] boggles the mind.” Thus, he analogized, if newspapers have
broad First Amendment protections, so must corporations.
But of course newspapers have broader First Amendment rights than
4
corporations generally, Justice Stevens argued, pointing out that any other
1.
Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous
Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979).
2.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3.
Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4.
Id. at 951 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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conclusion would ignore an important piece of constitutional text—the Free
5
Press Clause. Now it was Justice Scalia’s turn to be baffled: “It is passing
strange to interpret the phrase ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press’ to mean,
not everyone’s right to speak or publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak
6
or the institutional press’s right to publish.” Justice Stevens, however, countered
that the textual and historical evidence behind the constitutional provisions
“suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be
7
able to claim special First Amendment status.” He accused the majority of
“tr[ying] to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, [when] the Free
8
Press Clause provides a more natural textual home.”
The debate in Citizens United over how to interpret the Press Clause
9
has not received much attention. But it should. The justices were blowing
the dust off of a constitutional question that the Court had not addressed in
thirty years: Does the Press Clause have significance separate from the Speech
Clause, or is it nothing more than “complementary to and a natural extension
10
of Speech Clause liberty” with no functional role?
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no
11
law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the Press.” Yet despite this textual
mandate and Chief Justice John Marshall’s admonition that “[i]t cannot be
12
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,”
13
a majority of the Court has, in essence, dismissed the clause as a constitutional
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 928 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7.
Id. at 951 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8.
Id.
9.
See Seth Korman, Citizens United and the Press: Two Distinct Implications, 37 RUTGERS L.
REC. 1, 2–3 (2010) (observing that “by affording all corporations the same rights as those granted the
media, the decision at the same time seems to further enfeeble the Press Clause”); Eugene Volokh,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/lessenedcorporate-first-amendment-rights-and-media-corporations (arguing that the Press Clause protects
“a technology” only). This debate over the significance of the Press Clause is also arguably dicta. See
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 976 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our
colleagues have raised some interesting and difficult questions . . . about how to define what constitutes
the press. But that is not the case before us.”).
10.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring).
11.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); accord District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008); see also Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a
Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 640 (1975) (“As nature
abhors a vacuum, the law cannot abide a redundancy. The presumption is strong that language used
in a legal instrument, be it a constitution, a statute, or a contract, has meaning, else it would not
have been employed.”).
13.
While Justice Stevens’s reading of the clause puts him in the minority of the current
Court, his opinion in Citizens United was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
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redundancy. The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value
14
of the free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or
15
protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause. Because the freedoms
to publish and to disseminate speech are also protected by the Speech Clause,
the Press Clause has been left with nothing to do. Members of the press thus
enjoy the same freedoms of expression as any individual person, but nothing
16
more. The rights to publish or to broadcast are the same as the right to speak,
and what narrow protections for newsgathering the Court has recognized, such
as limited rights of access to judicial proceedings, have been housed in a muddy
combination of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and press and granted to
17
everyone, not just the press. The result is exactly what Chief Justice Marshall
warned against—a specific constitutional phrase that has been dismissed as
18
“mere surplusage.”
Writing off the Press Clause as nothing more than the framers’ gentle
19
reminder that we all have a right to publish our speech is problematic on
several levels. As a textual matter, it suggests that a pronouncement in the
First Amendment, at most, restates only the obvious. And as a practical
matter, it is unsatisfying to have a Press Clause that is powerless to protect
14.
See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role
as a check on government abuse.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) (stating that the press plays an “essential role in our democracy”); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“The Constitution specifically selected the press, which
includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs.”).
15.
See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a
matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the
freedom of the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“The Court has never explicitly recognized that the Press
Clause involves any significant content different from that provided to all individuals by the
prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”); see also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime,
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 69–70 (2006) (explaining that while early press cases did rely explicitly on
the Press Clause, over time the Court’s cases reveal an “abandonment of the Press Clause as a specific
source of constitutional authority” as “the Court gave the press whatever rights it recognized under
the Speech Clause”).
16.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“Freedom of the press is a
‘fundamental personal right’ which ‘is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.’” (quoting Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938))); Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its
First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 225.
17.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(holding that in criminal trials, “media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public”).
18.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
19.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing
that the Speech Clause protects the right “to express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses
specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly” (footnote omitted)).
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reporters who, as members of the press, endeavor to inform the public and to
check the government. The Court’s refusal to breathe life into the Press
Clause has denied the press the attainment of constitutional rights of access to
government information, meetings, and places. Members of the press also have
no constitutional safeguards from government subpoenas and search warrants
20
21
22
demanding access to their sources, newsrooms, or work product. And if
23
a reporter commits a minor tort such as a technical trespass, a minor
24
25
deception, or a breach of loyalty, —all common tools in undercover
reporting—no judicial consideration is given to the fact that she was engaged
in newsgathering.
There is one formidable roadblock that stands in the way of recognizing the
Press Clause’s independent meaning—the problem of how to define the “press.”
Recognizing distinct rights and protections necessarily raises the question of who
26
would (and who would not) receive them. To many jurists and scholars, the
thought of identifying who constitutes the press reeks of government favoritism
27
toward a privileged few and discrimination against other, less favored speakers.
Chief Justice Burger expressed this skepticism when he observed that creating a
pecking order of communicators with some favored over others “is reminiscent
of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England—a system the
28
First Amendment was intended to ban from this country.” The myriad problems with determining who is or is not the press have been called “definitional
29
30
31
monsters,” “difficult and vexing,” and “painful.”

20.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21.
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
22.
See id.
23.
See Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978).
24.
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
25.
See id.
26.
See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(arguing that a “fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status
on a limited group is one of definition”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972) (“The
administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual
difficulties of a high order.”).
27.
See, e.g., David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 102–03 (1975);
Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 626–27 (1979).
28.
First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 797–802 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Branzburg, 408 U.S.
at 705 n.40.
29.
Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1411 (10th Cir. 1985).
30.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
31.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 572.
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Despite these obstacles, many have attempted to define the press. But in
doing so, the natural urge is often toward a broad, overly inclusive definition that
mirrors the Court’s expansive reading of the Speech Clause. Our free speech
jurisprudence is one of constitutional overprotection that seeks to embrace the
33
so-called fringe speaker and speech that is of peripheral, or even no, value.
But while constitutional overprotection makes sense as an interpretive
theory of the Speech Clause, it does not logically transfer to the Press Clause for
two primary reasons. First, a broad definition of the press, somewhat ironically,
results in fewer press rights overall. For the Press Clause to mean something
independent of the Speech Clause, it necessarily cannot apply to everyone.
If every individual is also a journalist or every message is also news, then there

32.
See, e.g., SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE
PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 89 (2007) (defining press freedoms as
“a personal right, which can be exercised by people who do not devote themselves professionally or
exclusively to journalism”); DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE
PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that anyone can produce the news); W. Lance
Bennett, The Twilight of Mass Media News: Markets, Citizenship, Technology, and the Future of
Journalism, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION 111, 112 (Timothy E.
Cook ed., 2005) (“Today, anyone with a computer or a mobile phone is a potential reporter and
publisher.”); Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the
Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 137, 137 (2003) (arguing
that the definition should focus on “the process through which information that is useful to selfgovernance is gathered and provided to the public”); Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law
of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 829 (1999) (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”);
Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling With a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law,
103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 450–51 (1999) (suggesting that courts could define a journalist “in terms of one
who provides information to inform the voting of wise decisions, a powerful goal of free speech often
associated with philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn”); Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need
Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 425 (2006) (proposing
the “journalistic process test,” a functional consideration of whether the person “adhere[s] to a code of
journalist professionalism”); Diana Owen, “New Media” and Contemporary Interpretations of Freedom
of the Press, in FREEING THE PRESSES, supra, at 139, 158 (predicting that the “already flimsy
boundaries of the institutional press are likely to disintegrate” and be replaced by an “open press”
model where the rights belong to individuals and not an institution); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 520 (2007) (arguing that a qualified
testimonial privilege “should apply to anyone disseminating information to the public who is called
to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding”); Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong
Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979)
(“[A]ll citizens exercising the press function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the
‘institutional press,’ warrant [constitutional] protection.”); Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the
Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1601 n.243 (2008) (favoring a definition of the press that
includes “anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public interest to the
public”).
33.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971) (“To many, the immediate consequence
of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.”).
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is no need for two distinct clauses. This is the prevailing view today. The
35
justices’ understandable desire to avoid favoring an elite group has led them
to allow the Speech Clause to swallow up the Press Clause. In other words,
the otherwise admirable and democratic objective to leave no one out of the
36
press club creates a boomerang effect that results in no club at all. But a
limited press club is essential to unlocking the full potential of the Press Clause,
as bestowing potential Press Clause rights such as certain investigative
immunities to all members of the public would be impossible. In our drive
for constitutional overprotection, therefore, we have created constitutional
underprotection. Because the Press Clause lies dormant, rather than enjoying
more constitutional rights, we have fewer.
The second reason it is not essential to adopt an overly protective approach
to the Press Clause is that it enjoys fallback protections secured by the Speech
Clause. These fallback protections lessen the impact of excluding some but not
others as well as the costs of any definitional mistakes. We embrace constitutional overprotection when it comes to speech because the price of line-drawing
errors is so high. If a speaker or a message is placed outside the protections of
the Speech Clause, his or her voice is lost entirely and the idea does not enter
37
38
our public debate. This is a constitutional cost that the Court takes seriously,
and rightfully so.
An interpretation of the Press Clause, however, that would allow
journalists additional and unique protections, primarily with respect to newsgathering, does not present this risk. All speakers, whether deemed members of

34.
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We protect the press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees.
This solicitude implies no endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser
First Amendment protection.”).
35.
See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all
persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. ‘ . . . the liberty of the press is no
greater and no less . . .’ than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic.” (quoting Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
36.
See infra Part.III.B.2.
37.
See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”
(citation omitted)).
38.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (comparing content-based
regulations on speech to content-neutral ones, which “pose a less substantial risk of excising certain
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue”).
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the press or not, retain their strong rights of expression, which include a right
not to be subjected to government regulation based on the content of their
speech. While any definition of the press will necessarily be imperfect, these
mistakes at the margins will not remove a speaker’s voice from our public debate
as would a miscalculation in interpreting the Speech Clause. Even a wrongly
excluded speaker will be able to express himself and will be protected by the
myriad speech safeguards such as protections against prior restraints and
content-based discrimination. Thus, the costs of error are much lower with the
Press Clause, making constitutional overprotection not necessary.
By adopting the same overly protective approach to the Press Clause that
we embrace with the Speech Clause, we have been sucked into a constitutional feedback loop: An overly broad definition of the press means virtually
complete overlap between press and speech and thus no way to meaningfully
interpret the Press Clause. Awakening the Press Clause requires embracing a
definition of the press that is sufficiently narrow. Yet our overprotective instincts
continually push us back toward a broad definition. The temptation then
returns to declare that everyone is the press, and the cycle continues.
In this Article, I seek to break this cycle by arguing that we should not
fear the idea of press exceptionalism. We instead should recognize the unique
role of the press—as compared to individual speakers—through a narrow, and
thus useful, definition. In doing so, we will be giving long overdue weight to this
important constitutional text. In addition to supporting a narrower definition
of the press, I submit that the definitional problem itself is manageable, in
part because line-drawing perfectionism is not required thanks to the fallback
protections of the Speech Clause. While I do not offer a definitive solution to
the problem in this Article, I look to the unique functions of the press in our
society and our democracy to offer some initial thoughts on which I will
expand in a future article.
My analysis unfolds in several parts. Part I examines current interpretations of the Speech and Press Clauses and how the Court has allowed the
latter to become constitutionally meaningless. Part II discusses the types of
rights and protections an awakened Press Clause could offer. Part III considers
how to define the press, exploring how the constitutionally overprotective
approach of our speech jurisprudence is unnecessary in the press context
because of the boomerang effect and the differences in fallback protections. A
review of state and legislative experimentation with defining the press then
establishes that the definitional problem is manageable. I conclude by offering
preliminary thoughts on how the Court might give the term “press,” as read
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in the First Amendment, a narrow and meaningful definition based on functional considerations.

I.

NO “MERE SURPLUSAGE”: RESCUING THE PRESS CLAUSE FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL REDUNDANCY

What does the Press Clause mean, and does it differ from the Speech
Clause? On a purely textual basis, the answers to these questions seem clear—
it means something, and it is different. Yet somehow, over time, this promising
provision has devolved into nothing more than constitutional window dressing.
The Court’s modern practice of reading the First Amendment with its judicial
thumb over the Press Clause has led to wide acceptance that the Press Clause has
39
become “redundant and thus irrelevant” and “about as useful as the vermiform
40
appendix.” Yet this marginalization of the Press Clause is contrary to both the
clear meaning of the words and to the common intuition that there does exist
a press that performs a special role in our democracy and is deserving of constitutional status outside the shadow of the Speech Clause.
Any fair reading of the Constitution begins with the text, and the text of
the First Amendment suggests that the Press Clause should be read separately
from the Speech Clause. The two rights, of course, are mentioned individually
and even separated grammatically by a comma: “Congress shall make no
41
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The framers have
42
been accused of being “especially promiscuous” with their use of commas. But
even accepting that the Constitution includes both “meaningful” and
“superfluous” commas, “[i]t seems most charitable to begin with the presumption
that commas were intended to be meaningful, so that the burden of proof should
43
be on the person who wishes to ignore certain commas as superfluous.” In
addition to the comma, the use of the disjunctive conjunction “or” denotes
separateness implying that Congress could potentially violate one but not
the other.
Additionally, the Speech and Press Clauses are grouped together and
separated from the other First Amendment liberties by semicolons. This suggests
39.
Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256,
1257 (2005).
40.
Paul Horwitz, “Or of the [Blog],” 11 NEXUS 45, 46 (2006).
41.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42.
Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation
and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 245 n.46 (1995).
43.
Id.
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that they were seen as sharing a commonality. Yet the First Amendment’s
prohibitions against laws “respecting the establishment of religion, or pro44
hibiting the free exercise thereof” or the protections of “the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
45
grievances” are also grouped together by semicolons. The Court, however,
does not read either of these pairings to be anything other than separate, if
related, constitutional provisions each with its own independent signific46
ance. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause both fall under
the umbrella of the “freedom of religion,” yet they have never been viewed as
47
redundant. So too with the Speech Clause and the Press Clause; they are
logically read as related in nature but properly assigned different tasks.
Plain meaning textualism asks, “[G]iven the ordinary meanings of words
and accepted precepts of grammar and syntax, what does the provision signify
48
to the reasonable person?” A reasonable person would clearly conclude that
the words “freedom of speech” have a meaning that is significantly different
49
from the words “freedom . . . of the press.”
One seemingly reasonable way to read the two clauses as having different
meanings is to conclude that the Speech Clause and the Press Clause together
provide that “individuals have the right to disseminate their views as well as
50
51
to voice them.” This is the view of Justice Scalia in Citizens United and,
52
indeed, is the prevailing view.
This alleged division of labor between the two phrases, however, is more a
mirage than a distinct difference. What makes this interpretation a difference

44.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45.
Id.
46.
See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815–16 (2010) (addressing an
Establishment Clause claim but not a Free Exercise claim); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010) (discussing a Free Exercise Clause claim but not an Establishment Clause
claim); Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 456, 457 (2010) (granting certiorari in a case involving a
Petition Clause claim); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that the right to peaceably assemble “has not generally been thought to protect the right
peaceably to assemble only when the purpose of the assembly is to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances”).
47.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–33 (1962) (discussing the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses and stating that “[a]lthough these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom”).
48.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994).
49.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50.
Baker, supra note 15, at 956 (noting that “[a]ccording to this reading of Court decisions,
the Press Clause is not meaningfully separate from the Speech Clause”).
51.
130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
52.
See Baker, supra note 15, at 956 (calling this “the common view”).
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without a distinction is that the Speech Clause has been interpreted to include
far more rights than simply the right to speak. The Court has repeatedly held
that the freedom of speech also includes the freedom to have willing, and
53
54
sometimes even unwilling, audience members receive the speech. The
protection the Speech Clause provides, the Court has stated, is “to the com55
munication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Thus with the Speech
Clause already protecting both the right to express a message and the right
to have it received by listeners, viewers, or readers, there is no additional task
for the Press Clause. A Press Clause that protects only the right of individuals
to disseminate their speech is redundant. Some propose that the Press Clause
56
protects a particular technology—the printing press. Again, however, this
would suggest that the Speech Clause does not secure the rights to disseminate
one’s speech via a particular method. This is in conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the Speech Clause. Even Chief Justice Burger, a proponent of the
view that the Speech Clause protects expression and the Press Clause protects
dissemination, acknowledged that there is “no fundamental distinction
57
between expression and dissemination.” Therefore, the claim that the Speech
Clause protects speech while the Press Clause protects dissemination is an
insufficient response to the textual evidence that the Press Clause and the
Speech Clause are distinct.
Despite this textual and structural evidence, the Supreme Court has never
recognized any constitutional rights or protections belonging exclusively to the
58
press that are distinct from the speech rights that all individuals (and even

53.
See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 373 (1997) (stating that “in public
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide
adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
54.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
757 (1976) (stating that the freedom of speech “necessarily protects the right to receive” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the
freedom of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It
is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); see
also Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to
Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1.
55.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
56.
See Volokh, supra note 9 (arguing that the Press Clause protects the press only as “a
technology,” not as “an industry”).
57.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978).
58.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 432 (“Nonconstitutional sources of
special protection for the press are far more numerous.”).
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corporations) enjoy and has only implicitly recognized differences between the
60
two in select areas. This ongoing refusal to recognize any significance to the
separateness of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press has led
the Court to use the phrases interchangeably, frequently combining them
61
under the umbrella of the freedom of expression.
As constitutional liberties go, the Press Clause is a late bloomer, with the
62
Court not deciding a single press case until 1925 and not applying the provi63
sion to the states until 1931. There was a brief period between the 1930s and
the 1960s when the Court occasionally emphasized the Press Clause, although
without explicitly relying on it as a separate right—a period that David
Anderson has referred to as “the heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme
64
Court.” It was not until the 1970s and 1980s, however, that the Court’s press
jurisprudence ripened. And it was during this more recent period that the Court
65
decreed that there is no independent role for the clause.
While there are many cases that are often hailed as important press
cases because the primary beneficiaries were journalists, the Court in these cases
actually based its decisions on the Speech Clause or the freedom of expression
and awarded rights or protections to everyone. In the famous defamation case,
66
New York Times v. Sullivan, for example, the benefactors of the favorable

59.
See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”); accord Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those
enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.”); Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (“[T]he media have no special right of access to [a county jail] different
from or greater than that accorded the public generally.”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”).
60.
See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (stating that freedom
of the press fosters “discussion of governmental affairs” and other public issues); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 864
(Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the press has a “constitutionally established role”).
61.
See Elisabeth Zoller, The United States Supreme Court and the Freedom of Expression, 84
IND. L.J. 885, 886 (2009) (observing that “freedom of expression” is frequently used by the Court
because “[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press are so united in American culture today that, in
practice, the Court makes almost no distinction between the two”).
62.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
63.
Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
64.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 448.
65.
There is, however, some argument that the Court has implicitly recognized some differences
between the clauses during this modern period. See Baker, supra note 15, at 958–59 (arguing that
existing Court doctrine does recognize special treatment for the press).
66.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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67

“actual malice” standard were the newspaper and four individual nonmedia
68
defendants. The Court noted that the protective standard applied equally to
69
the press and to the “citizen-critic.” The Court made it even clearer that
media and nonmedia defendants receive the same constitutional protection
70
in defamation cases in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
Admittedly, the Court came close to recognizing a differing standard for the
71
press in select cases such as Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, in which
the Court ruled that defamation plaintiffs suing a “media defendant” must
72
bear the burden of proving the falsity of the statement. Yet in a footnote, the
Court stated that it was not deciding what the burden would be if the case
73
involved a nonmedia defendant, and the Court in subsequent cases has
refused to create different defamation standards for media and nonmedia defen74
75
dants. Likewise, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court relied
on the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly to conclude that the First
Amendment guarantees the right of the public, not just of the press, to attend
76
The Court’s reluctance to award the press any unique
criminal trials.
privileges has led it to adopt these broad holdings regardless of the desire or
need of the public for the constitutional rights. In Richmond Newspapers, for
example, the Court admitted that “[t]he public was not seeking access to
77
courtrooms . . . and could not be widely accommodated if it did.” Further, it
reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that giving the press “special
67.
The “actual malice” standard requires that a plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit show that the
defendant published the statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279–80.
68.
Id. at 256.
69.
Id. at 282.
70.
472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (applying the same defamation standards to media and
nonmedia defendants).
71.
475 U.S. 767 (1986).
72.
Id. at 775. Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931), may also be seen as
a press-only case because the Court spoke of the freedom of the press as including a right not to be
subject to a prior restraint. But that case has been interpreted subsequently as prohibiting prior
restraints on all speakers. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010).
73.
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 779 n.4.
74.
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that the plurality did not distinguish between media and nonmedia defendants); id. (“[T]he
First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others
exercising their freedom of speech. None of our cases affords such a distinction; to the contrary, the
Court has rejected it at every turn.”); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001)
(“[W]e draw no distinction between the media respondents and [the individual who disclosed the
secretly recorded tape].”).
75.
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
76.
Id. at 577.
77.
Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15, at 75.
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seating and priority of entry” would “contribute to public understanding of the
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal
78
justice system.” Ultimately, the Court has made clear its view that “the press
does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to
79
enlighten,” and thus all protections belong to the public as well as the press.
In the same vein, when the press has lost major constitutional cases, the
decisive argument has been that the press must follow the same rules as
everyone else. The Court, for example, held that journalists enjoy no additional protections from government searches or subpoenas. In Branzburg
80
v. Hayes, a majority of the justices refused to give the reporters any immunity from having to testify before a grand jury and reveal their confidential
sources and information. They did so out of a refusal to “interpre[t] the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do
81
not enjoy.” The Court also rejected an argument claiming that newspapers
should have special immunity from the execution of search warrants for their
82
newsrooms and files. Similarly, the Court denied the press the claimed rights
83
to travel to Cuba for newsgathering purposes and to avoid liability under
“generally applicable laws” even if they have “incidental effects on [the] abil84
ity to gather and report the news.”
To support his interpretation of the Press Clause as protecting only
85
“the liberty to disseminate expression broadly,” Chief Justice Burger relied
86
heavily on the historical viewpoint of constitutional scholar David Lange.
Lange contended that “the freedom of speech, or of the press” is a constitutional redundancy because the two terms “were used quite interchangeably
87
in the eighteenth century.” Lange argued that the freedom of the press
evolved as an extension or amplifier of the freedom of speech. He referenced
English history, throughout which “the exercise of free expression obviously
88
was confined by one’s capacity to disseminate one’s thoughts.” These limits
on expression were loosened by the invention of the printing press, which
78.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978).
80.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
81.
Id. at 690.
82.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
83.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
84.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (holding that “generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because [of] their enforcement against the press”).
85.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring).
86.
See id. at 798.
87.
Lange, supra note 27, at 88.
88.
Id. at 93.
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ensured that those other than the “rich and powerful” also had the tools to
89
communicate effectively. The printing press sparked a revolution of political
90
thought that led to sweeping regulations by the King. According to Lange,
this “heritage of struggle” between the Crown and his English subjects gave free
speech “new vitality by the introduction of the press, [which] colonials brought
91
with them to the New World.” The two terms were thus interchangeable
because “[f]ree speech could not exist in the fullest sense without freedom of
the press; a free press, on the other hand, had no occasion to exist without
92
freedom of speech.”
Lange’s interpretation, however, is only one of several prominent
93
academic theories about the original intent behind the two clauses. First
Amendment scholar David Anderson concluded that “[f]reedom of the
94
press—not freedom of speech—was the primary concern of [the framers].”
Anderson relied on the events and documents of early American history to
95
96
reach his conclusion, including pre-revolutionary declarations, state consti97
98
99
tutions, the Constitutional Convention, the state ratifying conventions,
the writing of the First Amendment in the First Congress, and the ratification

89.
Id. at 93–94.
90.
Id. at 94–95.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 96.
93.
See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 272 (1985) (“When the framers of
the First Amendment provided that Congress shall not abridge the freedom of the press they could
only have meant to protect the press with which they were familiar and as it operated at the time.
They constitutionally guaranteed the practice of freedom of the press. They did not adopt its legal
definition as found in Blackstone or in the views of libertarian theorists. By freedom of the press
the Framers meant a right to engage in rasping, corrosive, and offensive discussions on all topics of
public interest.”).
94.
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 533 (1983).
95.
But see Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177,
203, 214–15 (1984) (critiquing Anderson’s article as “confused” and arguing that “his use of
historical evidence is irresponsible and a major weakness of his article”).
96.
Anderson, supra note 94, at 463–64 (“The last right we shall mention, regards the
freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government, in its ready communication of thoughts between subjects . . . whereby oppressive
officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.”).
97.
Id. at 464 (noting that nine of the eleven state constitutions adopted during the
Revolutionary War included clauses protecting a free press).
98.
Id. at 487 (stating that freedom of the press “was included in the bill of rights proposed at
the constitutional convention; after that proposal was rejected, it was the only right proposed
independently”).
99.
Id. (stating that five of the seven proposed bills of rights at the ratifying conventions
included provisions for freedom of the press).
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of the First Amendment. Anderson did not claim that the framers had any
101
Rather, he argued that
“comprehensive theory of freedom of the press.”
“[they] perceived, however dimly, naively, or incompletely, that freedom of
the press was inextricably related to the new republican form of government
and would have to be protected if their vision of government by the people was
102
to succeed.” Anderson had a like-minded counterpart on the Supreme Court
in Justice Stewart, who also advocated for a distinct interpretation of the Press
Clause. Justice Stewart concluded that the framers drafted the Press Clause as a
structural provision that would allow the press to serve as the “fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
103
branches.” The inclusion of two separate rights, he contended, “is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the
104
press in American society.”
Virtually all who have studied the issue have conceded that the original
meaning of the two clauses is not obvious. Lange admitted that “the Framers
have left us language in the first amendment . . . which, under almost any view
105
one takes, is less than clear,” and Anderson acknowledged that the “Framers
106
simply did not articulate what they meant by ‘freedom of the press.’” In their
treatise on the freedom of speech, Rodney Smolla and Melville Nimmer
summarized that “[h]istory casts little light on whether the Framers intended
107
the Press Clause to have meaning palpably different than the Speech Clause.”
Interpreting the Press Clause as either a literal or a functional redundancy is problematic. A textual analysis strongly indicates that the Speech and
Press Clauses protect different rights. The simple explanation that one protects
expression while the other safeguards dissemination, however, conflicts
with the Court’s broad view of speech rights. The historical evidence on the
meaning of the phrases is, at best, conflicting. Yet the Court appears to have
gone out of its way to treat the press the same as the general public without
100.
Id. at 475–85.
101.
Id. at 536.
102.
Id. at 537.
103.
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
104.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); see
also Abrams, supra note 1, at 579 (“Whatever other conclusions may be drawn—and disputes
engaged in—from the history of the adoption of the press clause of the first amendment, one thing
is clear: The press clause of the first amendment was no afterthought, no mere appendage to the
speech clause.”).
105.
Lange, supra note 27, at 88.
106.
Anderson, supra note 94, at 486.
107.
3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 22.4 (2010).
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giving sufficient weight to the textual meaning of the two phrases and the
functional difference between individual speakers and the press. As an
interpretive matter, this approach is unsettling; and, as a practical one, it robs
us of a functioning Press Clause.

II.

WAKING THE SLEEPING GIANT: WHAT MIGHT
THE PRESS CLAUSE DO?

The debate over whether to interpret the Press Clause as independently
significant also includes a discussion of pragmatic considerations. Is there a
need or a place for an awakened Press Clause? How would it function? What
role might it play?
It is undisputed that the Speech Clause broadly protects expression. The
freedom of speech provides powerful safeguards from prior restraints and
places a “heavy burden of showing justification for imposition of such a
108
restraint” on government officials who try to stop speech before it is spoken
or published. Any regulation on speech that is content based must survive
109
strict scrutiny, and subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination are vir110
111
tually never tolerated. In the interest of providing “breathing space” and
avoiding a chilling effect, the courts have interpreted the First Amendment
as providing immunity to speakers from liability even when their speech
112
113
causes harm to others such as defamation, privacy violations, inflictions of
114
115
emotional distress, and even physical harm. Federal and state lawmakers
must draft any regulations with the utmost precision to avoid the “strong medi116
cine” of the First Amendment’s vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. The

108.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
109.
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“[A]ny restriction
based on the content of . . . speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”).
110.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Premised on
mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints.”).
111.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
112.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
113.
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
114.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
115.
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).
116.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
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government may not license or tax speech. The Court also has interpreted
the types of expression that are protected broadly to include not just words
that are spoken, published, or broadcast, but also nonverbal expression such as
118
music, dance, art, and forms of silent communication. Similarly, the Court
has held that the Speech Clause protects “expressive conduct” like flag or draft
119
card burning and donations to political campaigns.
These expansive constitutional protections, it has been often repeated,
are a reflection of our “profound national commitment to the principle that
120
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” They
further reflect our varied views of freedom of speech as an avenue to self121
122
fulfillment and as a vibrant marketplace of ideas.
With all of these protections for speech, it is worth asking whether there
is any role left for an independent Press Clause. The answer lies not with the
protection of the news itself once it is published or broadcast, but rather with
the process of obtaining it. Once the press obtains information, its right to
publish is indisputably strong. But when the courts turn to the newsgathering
123
process, the First Amendment seems to disappear.
124
The Court has recognized that the press informs the public and checks on
125
And it has acknowledged that
“what the government is up to.”
126
“newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections,” for “without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis127
cerated.” Yet despite these recognitions of the important role that the press

117.
Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (holding that “a [governmental]
scheme conditioning expression on a licensing body’s prior approval of content presents peculiar
dangers to constitutionally protected speech” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
119.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
120.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
121.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
122.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123.
Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that
the “corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news”).
124.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (recognizing that
“media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that their resources are devoted to
the collection of information and its dissemination to the public”).
125.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves and was designed to
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve.”).
126.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
127.
Id. at 681.
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128

plays in our democracy, the Court rarely has supported these statements
through actual safeguards for the process of seeking or obtaining information. It
has furthermore never protected the rights of the press qua press to gather the
news.
When faced with constitutional challenges to the government’s
impairment of access to information, the Court quickly becomes skeptical
129
that the First Amendment is implicated and sees itself as navigating “trea130
cherous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the First Amendment.”
The Court fears creating an expansive—and unworkable—right of access,
noting that “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
131
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.” Instead, the Court
has drawn the constitutional line at publication and has held that when there
is “no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material,”
132
the First Amendment protections diminish sharply.
Thus, the Court has
concluded that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
133
unrestrained right to gather information.”
This approach to the First Amendment does a disservice to the important role that constitutional protections for the newsgathering process could
play in the public discourse. It further overlooks the value of the Press Clause
to allow appropriate (as opposed to “unrestrained”) rights for the press to
gather information.
A dynamic Press Clause could deliver a number of rights and protections.
Whereas today journalists can be subpoenaed to testify and forced to reveal
134
135
confidential sources or, if they refuse to cooperate, held in contempt and
128.
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (lauding the press’s “impressive
record of service over several centuries” in “guard[ing] against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism”); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (noting the press’s role in “exposing corruption among public
officers and employees”).
129.
See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
130.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 699.
131.
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17.
132.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
133.
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.
134.
See Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book Chapter, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, at A17 (discussing New York Times reporter who was subpoenaed to reveal confidential
sources); see also Shields and Subpoenas: The Reporter’s Privilege in Federal Courts, REPORTERS COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html#number (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
135.
Torsten Ove, Ex-Reporter Put in Tough Spot in Fight Over Sources, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Mar. 16, 2008, at A1 (discussing former USA Today reporter being held in contempt for refusing to
identify her confidential sources).
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sometimes jailed, a Press Clause with bite could offer them reliable protection
from prosecution in many cases. Further, the ability to convey this constitutional
137
guarantee to potential sources would unlock doors to future information.
The same is true when government officials attempt to seize reporters’ phone
138
records or mail.
The fact that members of the press are engaged in newsgathering,
moreover, is not a factor when it comes to prosecution for ordinary torts or
139
other law violations. For example, journalists can be held liable for trespass
onto property that is the scene of a crime or accident even when invited or
140
accompanied by law enforcement. An undercover reporter who misrepresents herself or her motivations by not revealing that she is investigating a news
141
story can be held liable for fraud or breach of the duty of loyalty. If she is
wearing a hidden microphone or camera, she might face charges for wiretapping
142
or eavesdropping. Journalists also may be prohibited from entering places of
136.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006)
(concerning a video blogger who spent more than seven months in jail for refusing to comply with
a subpoena seeking his testimony and video footage); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397
F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concerning a former New York Times reporter who spent eighty-five days
in jail for refusing to identify her confidential source); Blogger Released From Prison, REPORTERS
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://rcfp.org/news/2007/0404-con-blogge.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011); Vanessa Leggett Released From Jail After 168 Days, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/news/releases/view.php?2002_01_04_vlreleas.txt (last visited Feb.
22, 2011) (concerning a freelance author who was held in contempt and served 168 days in jail for
refusing to turn over tapes of interviews she had conducted with witnesses who prosecutors believed
had information relevant to a murder investigation).
137.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 (considering reporters’ argument that they should have
testimonial privileges “because if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose
other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in
the future”).
138.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2006) (concerning a U.S.
Attorney who seized the phone records of two New York Times reporters in order to learn the
identities of their confidential sources); Mara H. Gottfried, Police Return Reporter’s Records, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 20, 2007, at B3 (reporting the police seizure of a television reporter’s cell phone
records to uncover the identity of one of his sources).
139.
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that reporters are not immune from fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, and trespass claims); United
States v. Matthews, 11 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660–64 (D. Md. 1998) (rejecting an argument by a journalist
that a federal statute prohibiting the receipt and transmission of child pornography should not apply to
him because he was researching a story about the availability of child pornography on the internet).
140.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th
Cir. 1997).
141.
See, e.g., Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 512–16.
142.
See, e.g., Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997); Dietmann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal.
1998) (noting that an intrusion of privacy committed as part of newsgathering might trigger some
constitutional protections for the reporter).
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public accommodation if they do so for the purpose of newsgathering rather
143
than to avail themselves of the goods or services provided by the business. This
is not to suggest that members of the press should be immune from laws; the
question is whether the act of newsgathering on behalf of the public should be
given any constitutional weight—currently, it receives none.
In addition to serving as a shield for reporters as they go about the process
of newsgathering, a revived Press Clause could work as a constitutional
sword. The press could claim constitutionally protected access rights to government information, places, and meetings. While reporters, along with
144
everyone else, can take advantage of the Freedom of Information Act and
145
its many state counterparts, there currently is no constitutional right of
access to government information, even when there is no state interest in the
146
government refusing to disclose. Likewise, the Court has repeatedly rejected
147
constitutional arguments in favor of access to government meetings and
148
government-run places.
Statutory provisions allowing access to information and places do some of
149
the work in protecting the newsgathering process. But members of the press
(along with the public) enjoy these privileges only at the pleasure of the
legislative branches. These statutory rights, therefore, are in constant risk of
being diminished or eliminated. Statutory protections, moreover, can be
inconsistent and vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, leading to uncertainty
and, potentially, a chilling effect. They frequently include numerous
150
exemptions or do not cover some information or meetings. In some cases,
moreover, such as those involving government-run places, there is no
statutory protection. A revitalized Press Clause could promote the same goals
143.
See Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978)
(upholding a finding of liability against a television station after its news crew entered the property of
a restaurant that had been cited for health code violations).
144.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
145.
See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, STATE OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE
(2006), available at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php (compiling the open records laws of all states).
146.
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (“Neither the First Amendment nor
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.”); Stewart, supra note 103, at 636 (“The Constitution
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”).
147.
See Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987).
148.
See Houchins, 438 U.S. 1; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
149.
See infra Part III.C.1.
150.
See, e.g., Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 832 F.2d at 1184–86 (dismissing on mootness grounds a
district court order stating that, while the press and the public did not have a statutory right to cover
a hearing by the Mine Safety and Health Administration, they did have a constitutional right to do so).
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but without the inconsistencies or risks of curtailment inherent in the
statutory rights.
The Court’s fear of opening the floodgates with an unrestrained right of
access is also unfounded. Even the broad speech liberties that the Court has
recognized are not absolute. Similarly, press advocates have not sought
complete protection of the newsgathering process. In the reporter’s privilege
151
case of Branzburg v. Hayes, for example, the journalists requested, and the
152
dissenters argued in favor of, only a qualified testimonial privilege. Ironically, in ruling against the reporters, Chief Justice Burger turned their request
for a conditional, as opposed to absolute, privilege against them. He reasoned
that “[i]f newsmen’s confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed
to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the
situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them
153
it would appear that only an absolute privilege would suffice.”
The reporter’s privilege is one of the few instances in which journalists
have sought to gain unique constitutional protections that would not apply
154
to all speakers. Yet a prominent part of the backlash against adopting an independent interpretation of the Press Clause both on and off the bench is the
155
perception that doing so would necessitate giving the press “special rights.”
First Amendment scholar and press advocate Floyd Abrams has challenged
framing the debate as “whether the press is entitled to ‘more’ first amendment
protection than others,” instead of as whether “the press, however defined, [is]
156
entitled to any different treatment because it is the ‘press.’”
It is important to emphasize that recognizing the independent significance of the Press Clause would result in a gain of constitutional protections
only. No one, whether a member of the press or not, would lose the expressive
151.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
152.
Id. at 680 (noting that the reporters assert they should not be forced to appear or testify
before a grand jury “until and unless sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter
possesses information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the
reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for the information is sufficiently
compelling to override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure”).
153.
Id. at 702.
154.
The reporters in Branzburg argued “that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either
not to identify the source of information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both;
that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so
identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from
furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by
the First Amendment.” Id. at 679–80.
155.
See William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred
Position,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 768 (1977).
156.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 570.
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rights that are already protected. There are no constitutional losers in this
equation. Rather, placing newsgathering within the protections of the First
Amendment would allow the Court to acknowledge the important and distinct
role of the press in informing the public and checking the government. The
Court has spoken of this role but has failed to support it and instead has let
the Press Clause slumber.

III.

DEFINING THE PRESS

Justice Stewart once observed that the press has the unique distinction
of being “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitu157
tional protection.” The exceptional status that this specific textual recognition gives to the press should not be taken lightly or ignored. As Justice Stevens
recently pointed out, the inclusion of the Press Clause suggests that the First
Amendment tolerates—indeed presumes—“some kinds of ‘identity’-based
distinctions” among speakers at least as far as whether they are a member of
158
the press. The problem, however, is figuring out how to make these constitutional distinctions between who is and who is not the press. Arriving at a
definition is so challenging that it is even difficult to settle on the appropriate
framing of the question: Do we identify the press based on who they are, what
they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to?
To date, the Court has not attempted to answer these questions and has
never decided whether any particular person or entity is a member of the press
159
under the First Amendment. Instead, when faced with the issue, the Court
160
has lamented the daunting task before it. Writing in Branzburg v. Hayes,
for example, Chief Justice Burger claimed that the Court could not
recognize a constitutional reporter’s privilege because the need to define who
qualified for the privilege “would present practical and conceptual difficulties
161
of a high order.” The undertaking is made all the more difficult, the Court

157.
Stewart, supra note 103, at 633.
158.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 952 n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159.
The Court has, however, decided cases in which it has simply accepted without analysis
that a party was a member of the press. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15,
at 70 (observing that in early cases the Court “simply assumed that the litigants were press and did
not consider how that identification might be made if it were not obvious”).
160.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
161.
Id. at 703–04.
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has noted, because constantly changing technology means that any
162
definition it might propose “would likely be born an anachronism.”
While there is no doubt that defining the “press” is not an easy task, the
difficulty of the challenge should not be an excuse to avoid the question
altogether. The Constitution demands that the Court take on a range of
abstract and complicated issues, and numerous constitutional phrases function
163
sufficiently despite a cloud of ambiguity. As Floyd Abrams has argued, “[I]t is
simply unacceptable to say that because a word in the Constitution is dif164
ficult to define, it should be afforded no meaning at all.”
A.

The Pull Toward an Overly Broad Definition

When faced with the seemingly herculean task of defining the press,
165
some have concluded that the difficulties are insurmountable; but there
are others who have ventured fearlessly onto the field of battle. The majority
of past attempts, however, have ended with an overly broad definition that
166
includes—or potentially could include—virtually everyone. The inevitable
consequence of this push toward overinclusiveness is a crippling of the Press
Clause. I contend that in order for the Press Clause to have the independent
weight it merits, the courts must give the term “press” a meaningfully narrow
162.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 782 (1985).
163.
See Abrams, supra note 1, at 580–81 (“A useful analogy is to that other central spoke of
the first amendment: freedom of religion. Consider the paradox. It is plain that ‘we will not tolerate
either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.’ Yet, despite
the evident risks of governmental decisionmaking in this excruciatingly sensitive area, we permit
judicial definition of what is and is not a religion and which allegedly religious activities are and are
not constitutionally protected.” (footnote omitted)).
164.
Id. at 583; see also Werhan, supra note 32, at 1600 (“The problem of defining ‘the press’
is hardwired into the First Amendment’s limitation of government authority over a free press, and it
cannot be avoided by ignoring the Press Clause.”).
165.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Sentelle, J., concurring) (“Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters
employed by Time magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend that
protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly newsletter to inform his
neighbors, lodge brothers, co-religionists, or co-conspirators? Perhaps more to the point today, does the
privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at
his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform whoever happens
to browse his way? If not, why not? How could one draw a distinction consistent with the court’s
vision of a broadly granted personal right?”); Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 435
(suggesting that “the demise of the press as a legally preferred institution is quite possible and perhaps
even probable”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need A Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
39, 47–48 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he idea of defining or ‘licensing’ the press in this manner is
anathema to our constitutional traditions” although it could be done legislatively).
166.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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definition. Why do we feel this pull toward an expansive definition? And how
can we resist this temptation in the future? I turn now to these questions.
1.

Free Speech Overprotection

The reason we so naturally gravitate toward an all-encompassing view of
the press lies in our attitude about the Speech Clause and our conviction that
First Amendment freedoms “are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
167
precious in our society.” With free speech, we have adopted an approach
of constitutional overprotection under which we gather the maximum number of speakers and messages within the protective confines of the First
Amendment. The reasons for taking this position with the Speech Clause are
valid: We fear that, in the absence of such protection, the government will
engage in viewpoint-based or other types of discrimination, resulting in the
168
complete loss of important ideas from our public debate.
For free speech advocates, the argument often focuses on protection of the
“fringe,” suggesting that low-value or questionable speech is necessary to guar169
antee the security of core, high-value speech. As a group of media amici once
explained to the Supreme Court, “[I]t is most often the speech at the fringes
170
of American life that defines the freedoms for those at the center.” The news
media in particular have embraced constitutional overprotection as a First
Amendment theory. Linda Greenhouse, the former New York Times Supreme
Court reporter, explained that the press “sees itself as the embattled defender
of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press” and
171
seizes upon each perceived affront whether “serious or slight.”
167.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
168.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (“Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword
to prevent the[ ] erosion [of First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The door barring
federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened
only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.”).
169.
See Patricia R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for the Fringe,
80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 924 (2000) (referring to this approach as “Fringe Protection Theory”).
170.
Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2,
Paladin Enters., Inc. v. Rice, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998) (No. 97-1325) (listing amici curiae as ABC, Inc.,
The E.W. Scripps Company, Media General, Inc., Media Professional Insurance, Inc., National
Association of Broadcasters, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., Newspaper Association of
America, PriMedia, Inc., Radio-Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists, Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression, Viacom Inc., and The Washington Post Company).
171.
Linda Greenhouse, Books of the Times: Embattled Defender, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1981, at
12. But see JOHN LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 101 (1980) (arguing
that during the pre–Civil War era the press did not actively defend First Amendment liberties).
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Free speech overprotection has become a popular theory thanks in part to
the fear of the slippery slope. The concern with allowing regulation of fringe
speakers is that it will lead quickly and seamlessly to censorship of high-value
172
speakers.
To prevent this, the belief is that we must construct a First
Amendment fortress wherein no speech can be permissibly restricted no
173
matter how questionable in value. Core, high-value speech is tucked safely
inside the fortress walls and far from the speech-restricting barbarians at
the gate.
The Court’s relationship with constitutional overprotection of the First
Amendment has been mixed. While the Court has rejected free speech abso174
lutism, it has adopted a paradigm that is highly skeptical of any government
175
regulation of speech based on its content (outside of a few narrowly defined
categories). If deemed to be content based, the regulation must be necessary
to further a compelling state interest and must be the least restrictive regu176
lation on speech necessary to serve that interest. This approach, at least in
theory, protects fringe speech with the same force as core speech and is in line
with the Court’s repeated declarations that core free speech rights need
177
breathing room before they are truly safe. The Court, however, does give
lesser protection to fringe speech through its practice of categorizing certain

172.
See Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 170, at 15 (“No expression—
music, video, books, even newspaper articles—will be safe from civil liability.”).
173.
Unless, most advocates concede, it squarely falls into one of the Court’s clearly delineated
categories such as obscenity. See, e.g., Brief for Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2010) (No. 08-1448) (listing amici curiae as The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The
American Society of News Editors, The First Amendment Project, The National Press Photographers
Association, The Radio-Television Digital News Association, The Society of Professional Journalists, and
Student Press Law Center) (arguing that “the unprotected categories of speech are extremely limited”
and should not be expanded).
174.
Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 807 (1993) (observing that
“[u]nder current doctrine, and under any sensible system of free expression, speech that lies at the
periphery of constitutional concern may be regulated on a lesser showing of harm than speech that
lies at the core”).
175.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (noting that the Court has
been “particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from
governmentally imposed sanctions”).
176.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents thus
apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content.”).
177.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
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low-value speech such as obscenity, commercial speech, and fighting
180
words as deserving lesser or no First Amendment protection.
Constitutional overprotection is an appealing approach for speech. It
ensures that the maximum amount of speech enters the public debate, avoids
the evils of prior restraints, and most importantly, guarantees that neither the
government nor juries are allowed to restrict speech simply because of a disa181
greement with the message or a dislike of the speaker. Indeed, the Court has
shown great sympathy for these arguments in cases like Hustler Magazine, Inc.
182
183
v. Falwell and Cohen v. California, and Justice Holmes famously extolled
the virtues of being “eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
184
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death.”
The numerous and widely varied functions of the Speech Clause also
support an approach of constitutional overprotection for speech. Jurists and
185
scholars have embraced the freedom of speech as a “good in itself” and “[t]he
186
essence of civic courage.” The Speech Clause has been called “powerful
187
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours” and is attributed with
178.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (holding that obscenity is “utterly
without redeeming social importance” and therefore “not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press”).
179.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(holding that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression”).
180.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (arguing that “the broadcasting of
patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities . . . surely lie at the
periphery of First Amendment concern”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(stating that there are certain categories of speech that may be constitutionally regulated, including
“the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words”).
181.
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“What the
Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to
decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”).
182.
485 U.S. 46 (1988). See id. at 50, 55 (concluding unanimously that the First Amendment
protected an advertisement parody that the Court found to be “gross and repugnant”—and intended
to inflict emotional injury on its subjects—in part because an alternative ruling “would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression”).
183.
403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (admonishing that we should embrace what might seem to be a
“trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege” as “not a sign of weakness
but of strength”).
184.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (stating that speech “cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”).
185.
EMERSON, supra note 121, at 6–9.
186.
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 691 (1988).
187.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
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serving a broad range of individual and societal values. The constitutional
protection of speech is credited with furthering our private and collective
188
searches for the truth through the creation and continuing replenishment
189
of the marketplace of ideas. The best way to assure this value, Judge Learned
190
Hand explained, is by letting loose a “multitude of tongues.” Our freedom
of speech, moreover, has been praised for fostering individual self-fulfillment,
191
participation in government, an adaptable and stable community, and a
192
To protect these valuable attributes, we have
more tolerant citizenry.
declared that we must be “particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expres193
sions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions.”
2.

Past Attempts at Defining the Press

It is thus through the lens of free speech overprotection that we turn to
the Press Clause generally and to the problem of defining the press
specifically. We carry with us the impulse to include as many speakers as
possible within the constitutional protections and these overprotective
instincts make us recoil at the prospect of favoring some while excluding
others. We are similarly distrustful of any effort to bestow power on a government entity to make this decision. Equally troubling is the blurriness and
malleability of the dividing line between constitutional statuses, which
leads us even further toward overinclusiveness. It is therefore not surprising
that most who have tried to tackle this problem have concluded that the
194
definition of the press must include virtually everyone.
One of the Court’s biggest supporters of a separate view of the Press
Clause, Justice Stewart, was an exception; he was comfortable with a narrow
188.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–55 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989) (1859).
189.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (observing that “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”).
190.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); see also Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“[T]he widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”).
191.
EMERSON, supra note 121, at 6–9.
192.
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
193.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988).
194.
In a study of the press-definition legal debate, scholars Erik Ugland and Jennifer
Henderson concluded that “the bias is toward an expansive definition of journalist.” Erik Ugland &
Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does It Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical
Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 243 (2007).
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view of the press. In his famous speech in support of additional press rights
in 1974, Justice Stewart referred simply to the “organized press,” which he
195
defined as “the daily newspapers and other established news media.” This
definition, however, was quickly and strongly criticized as being too restrictive. David Lange, for example, observed that it would exclude the occasional
or alternative publisher. Lange argued that exclusion of these types of publications is “perverse” because these are “two elements in the contemporary press
which the Framers themselves would have recognized” because of their simi196
larities to the pamphleteer and the underground newspaper.
To avoid similar criticisms, any attempt to define the press must deal
with the case of the romanticized “lonely pamphleteer” or, in today’s world, the
197
“the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas.” Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the press could not be defined in part
because of “the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the
198
lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher.”
But the problem with adopting a definition that includes anyone with access
to a laptop and a printer is that it effectively extinguishes all the airspace
between the press and a general speaker.
Indeed, defining the press has always been hard and keeps getting harder
because of new technologies and the emergence of an information-based
199
society. The “press,” for example, cannot simply mean all “written communication,” because that definition is so limited that it excludes broadcasting
and so broad that it includes written material that was never distributed to
200
anyone. It similarly cannot be all “information providers” because that definition would include any person or business that trades or sells information
201
regardless of its news value. In our information-based society, moreover, the
195.
Stewart, supra note 103, at 631 (reprinted from an address on Nov. 2, 1974, at the Yale
Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation in New Haven, Connecticut).
196.
Lange, supra note 27, at 106.
197.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also
Horwitz, supra note 40, at 46 (“We might say that the rise of the blog represents the realization of the
full promise of the ‘lonely pamphleteer.’”).
198.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Belloti, 435
U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)
(“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces
pamphlets and leaflets.”).
199.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905–06 (2010) (“With the
advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media
and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”).
200.
See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 651–52.
201.
Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 443 (noting that “information providers”
include “[f]inancial services, credit agencies, travel services, Internet service providers, telephone, cable, and
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line between those who trade in information and those who are news providers
202
David Anderson explained that
is becoming even more indecipherable.
“[i]t is impossible, or at least impractical, to extend press perquisites equally to all
information providers, and it is difficult to distinguish the press from the rest
203
because the press is ‘disappearing inside the larger world of communications.’”
Many scholars, therefore, have turned to a functional definition
instead—in other words, it is not who you are that makes you a member of
204
the press, but rather what you do. Linda Berger has suggested that the focus
should be on the purpose of the proposed protections, which is to provide
information to the public. She explained that “[i]t may be that those who fall
within a definition of journalist are those most likely to produce the desired
205
information, but they are certainly not the only individuals who might do so.”
Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence
in Journalism, described the process of determining who is a member of the
press: “You can’t say, ‘I’m a journalist, here’s my press pass.’ You have to say,
‘I’m a journalist. Here’s my work.’ Some of the people with press passes don’t
206
make the cut.” Similarly, Scott Gant, former counsel for The New Republic,
207
explained, “[J]ournalism is an endeavor, not a job title.” Thus, anyone with
a laptop, an internet connection, and the desire to relay what they hear, see,
or think can function as a journalist and deserves the same constitutional rights
satellite companies, public-relations counselors, mailing-list suppliers, directory publishers, healthinformation services, weather services, business consultants, and gambling tout sheets”).
202.
See Philip Meyer, Saving Journalism: How to Nurse the Good Stuff Until It Pays, COLUM. J.
REV. Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 55, 55 (“Our once noble calling is increasingly difficult to distinguish from
things that look like journalism but are primarily advertising, press agentry, or entertainment.”).
203.
Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 528 (quoting BILL KOVACH & TOM
ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 11 (2001)).
204.
See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 32, at 829 (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”);
Sack, supra note 32, at 629 (stating that “all citizens exercising the press function, including, but not
limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’ warrant such protection”); see also Berger,
supra note 32, at 1374 (proposing a functional definition that “focuses on the context within which
the need for a privilege and the balance of costs is most clear”); Horwitz, supra note 40, at 52 (“The
medium by which that journalism is disseminated to the public matters far less than the fact that an
individual has deliberately gathered and disseminated newsworthy facts.”); Ugland & Henderson,
supra note 194, at 247 (identifying the “egalitarian” definition of the press “in which all citizens are
equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering watchdogs”). But see Horwitz, supra
note 40, at 53 (observing that “the functional approach may avoid one definitional problem—are
blogs journalism?—only to replace it with other, equally difficult definitional questions: What is
journalism, exactly?”).
205.
Berger, supra note 32, at 1377.
206.
Gina Barton, What Is a Journalist?, QUILL, May 2002, at 10, 11; see also id. (quoting Lucy
Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, as suggesting that a journalist is
“someone who is collecting information with the purpose of disseminating it to the public”).
207.
GANT, supra note 32, at 6.
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and protections. In his book titled We’re All Journalists Now, Gant calls for
an end to any special treatment for the institutional press:
We should no longer accept the routine extension of special perks and
protections to professional journalists that are denied to others seeking to
engage in essentially the same activities. The First Amendment is for all
of us—and not just as passive recipients of what the institutional press
208
has to offer.

Gant’s claim that the news media enjoy “special perks” under existing law
209
is highly questionable, at least as a constitutional matter. But his sentiment is well received by many who share an aversion to the perceived elitism
inherent in making the press a select group. Anderson described this view of
the press—a view that he does not share—as “the tyranny of a self-appointed
elite that depicts the world through its own filter, tries to tell people what they
need to know, and bedevils their elected officials and their celebrities in the
210
name of their right to know.”
This backlash and fear of elitism has led others to warn that defining the
press at all could be detrimental to the press. Journalism scholar Philip Meyer
cautioned that “special rights for the press could easily lead to special responsibilities” and create a “slippery slope leading first to the licensing of jour211
nalists and ultimately to censorship.” Indeed, while the press is frequently
accused of seeking privileged rights for an elite few, the reality is quite the
opposite. When arguing as parties in lawsuits, press litigants have gone out of
their way not to seek special rights—an approach that paradoxically might
hurt their cause and result in fewer constitutional protections for the press.
A recent study of Supreme Court briefs filed by media litigants found that
journalists have “more consistently championed an ‘egalitarian’ conception
of the press that recognizes the ability and right of all citizens to seek and disse212
minate news.” Rather than seeking special rights, this study concluded that
media litigants “have been more diligent than the Court in avoiding references and arguments that separate speech and press and that imply the need
213
for unusual scrutiny of restraints media defendants.” This approach by press
208.
Id. at 5.
209.
See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 245–47.
210.
Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 529; see also Mike Godwin, Who’s a
Journalist?—II: Welcome the New Journalists on the Internet, 13 MEDIA STUD. J. 38, 38–39, 42 (1999)
(advocating the end of special privileges for the established press).
211.
Philip Meyer, What Defines a Journalist?, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2002, at 11A.
212.
See Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme
Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375, 380 (2009).
213.
Id.
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advocates has led to phenomenal successes in winning constitutional
protections for the free dissemination of news, but these rights were secured
214
almost entirely under the Speech Clause. When it comes to protections for
the newsgathering process under the Press Clause, though, the news media’s
215
win column is virtually empty.
In attempting to define the press, all roads lead to overprotection.
Whether it is out of a democratic embrace of equality, a fear of government
favoritism, or a repulsion to elitism, there is a shared instinct toward inclusion
and a resistance to exclusion.
B.

Embracing a Narrow Definition: Why Less Is More

Our urge to apply the same constitutional overprotection to the Press
Clause that we apply to the Speech Clause comes from an admirable place.
Including everyone within the definition of “press” appeals to our core democratic belief in equality as well as our faith in a vibrant marketplace of ideas. The
problem, however, is that the overprotective approach is not a good fit with
the Press Clause, and the consequence of this mismatch has been a serious
weakening, if not an elimination, of our constitutional press rights. A closer
analysis shows that constitutional overprotection is backfiring as a theory of
press freedoms and needlessly so. Unlike the Speech Clause, which may be
damaged without an expansive approach, the Press Clause could flourish under
a narrower regime without many of the risks inherent in a limited speech
theory. Thus, a narrower definition of the press can be both constitutionally
acceptable and functionally superior.
1.

Boomerang Effect

We need to resist the urge to overprotect press freedoms through an
overly broad definition of the press for one primary reason—it results in a
disappearance of press protections. It does so by creating a feedback loop that
ultimately erases any distinction between the Speech Clause and the Press
Clause and thus eliminates the need for separate press rights. Ironically, the
more vigorously that judges, scholars, and press advocates fight for broadly held
press rights, the less likely it is that these protections will materialize. In his
study of the definition of religion under the Free Exercise Clause, Philip
214.
215.

See, e.g., supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text.
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Hamburger noted the same phenomenon, “that an enlarged definition of any
right may invite limitations on the circumstances in which it is available . . .
216
and its effects are apt to be felt with particular regret.” The goal of constitutional overprotection has gone awry, and we are faced now with constitutional
underprotection in the form of an incapacitated Press Clause.
This boomerang effect works in three stages. In the first stage, described
above, we transfer our adoption of free speech overprotection to our interpreta217
tion of the Press Clause. This fuels our desire to create a definition of the press
that equally protects speakers and messages on the periphery and those at the
core. Ultimately, we are forced to declare that virtually everyone is, or can be,
a member of the press. In the second stage, this overly broad definition is
quickly revealed to be unworkable. The complication is that, for the Press
Clause and the Speech Clause to fill different roles, there needs to be a distinction between the press and everybody else. As Abrams explained, “The broader
the class included within the definition of press, the more attenuated the
218
distinction between press and speech.” In other words, for the Press Clause
to mean something, everyone cannot be a member of the press.
In the third and final stage, the Press Clause disappears into the Speech
Clause. Because the Speech Clause already broadly protects expression and
219
dissemination of expression, the Press Clause is not needed. And the Court
is reluctant to embrace what additional protections the clause could offer for
220
newsgathering because it would require recognizing those rights for everyone.
Thus, the efforts to broaden the First Amendment’s press freedoms through
an expansive definition have had the reverse effect and have left us with a
Press Clause that is a constitutional redundancy.
One potential approach that allows the Press Clause to function separately from the Speech Clause is to interpret the Press Clause as offering protections only for information gathering. This could create a distinct role for the
Press Clause even if the freedom of the press applied to everyone. There are,
though, two problems with this approach. The first is that the Court already
recognizes some rights to obtain information as part of our general speech

216.
Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004).
217.
See supra Part III.A.
218.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 583.
219.
See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
220.
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1977) (rejecting the contention
“that media personnel are the best qualified persons for the task of discovering malfeasance in public
institutions” and thus suggesting that everyone potentially could play this role).
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rights. The second problem is a pragmatic consideration and another key part
of the boomerang effect: It is highly impracticable to give these rights to
everyone. We cannot rationally exempt virtually everyone from some testimonial duties, protect them from otherwise justified searches, give them access
to government proceedings, or forgive them certain law violations like fraud
or trespass based simply on a cursory finding that they were attempting to
gather information with the intention of conveying it to others. It therefore
appears that if judges must choose between granting these rights to everyone
or no one, they will choose no one.
An overly broad definition of the press, moreover, does not allow members of the press—that is, those who have repeatedly committed time, resources
and advanced skills—to take advantage of their abilities to earn reputational
222
trust. It makes practical sense to give certain rights and privileges only to those
who have demonstrated that they are more likely to use these protections
responsibly and for the public good rather than to give similar rights to anyone
with a computer. Thus, the more exclusive and reputable the members of
the press club are, it should follow that the courts will be more comfortable
awarding them additional rights and protections under the First Amendment.
2.

Fallback Protections

The second important way that constitutional overprotection is not as
compatible with the Press Clause as it is with the Speech Clause is the existence
of fallback protections. A narrow definition of the press is not as constitutionally
problematic as might first appear because all individuals and entities have extensive communicative rights under the Speech Clause. In other words, our broad
free speech rights for everyone justify a narrow rights regime for the press.
We have embraced an approach of free speech overprotection out of a
desire to include the maximum number of voices and messages in our public
debate. The Supreme Court has declared that “[a]ll ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection

221.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (“Free speech carries
with it some freedom to listen. In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment
right to receive information and ideas.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222.
Horwitz, supra note 40, at 59 (“The established news media typically operate subject to a
set of ethical and professional norms, made explicit in a host of ethical codes and, more importantly,
absorbed by individual journalists in a deeply embedded sense of professional identity that shapes and
constrains their actions.”).
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of the guaranties” under the Speech Clause. This constitutional protection
alleviates concerns that expressive works that are not part of the press, but are
still valuable as art, fiction, science, history, or entertainment, remain protected
224
under the Speech Clause. The same is true for individuals seeking to express
themselves through their personal speech and even the occasional journalistic endeavor, regardless of whether they are deemed not to qualify as part
of the press under a narrow definition. At the same time, every person enjoys
the strongest protection against prior restraints, lessening the concerns that
225
a licensing system will be imposed.
This makes the Press Clause significantly different from the Speech
Clause. We strive to overprotect speech rights in part out of a fear of the
226
“grave results” of making a mistake. If a speaker is silenced or a message censored, the idea is removed completely from our public discourse. This can
lead to serious consequences, including the “standardization of ideas either
227
by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.” But
the potential costs when a speaker is excluded from the Press Clause are not
as high. Rather than being muzzled entirely, that speaker will still be free to
express his or her message to a wide audience.
By the same logic, the danger of creating a chilling effect, in which
potential speakers refrain from engaging in what would have been constitutionally protected speech out of a fear of prosecution, is far less with the Press
Clause than it is with the Speech Clause. While it is possible, indeed likely,
that some potential newsgatherers might refrain from taking action out of the
fear that they would not be deemed to be part of the press, they would simply
be left in the position that everyone (including journalists) are in today. They
228
could pursue their information through different avenues and disseminate
223.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
224.
See Bezanson, supra note 32, at 855–56 (arguing that works of fiction, history,
entertainment, and art are protected as speech, but not as press).
225.
In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), the Court declared that “[t]he liberty
of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets.” Yet that case involved a blatant licensing scheme that allowed for fines and imprisonment
of a pamphleteer who distributed her leaflets “without first obtaining written permission from the
City Manager.” Id. at 447.
226.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“Indeed, governments might soon seize
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of
unpopular views. We have been able . . . to discern little social benefit that might result from
running the risk of opening the door to such grave results.”).
227.
Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949).
228.
This is, essentially, where the media stands today. The Fourth Circuit, for example,
explained that it thinks the media has ample alternative avenues for newsgathering. See Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir. 1999) (“We are convinced that the
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their experiences, thoughts, and ideas broadly. Moreover, depending on the
definition of the press eventually adopted, they could endeavor to satisfy these
criteria and further ensure their enhanced protection as a member of the press.
These fallback protections lessen the impact of adopting a narrower definition of the press and provide protection against potential mistakes in line
drawing. As with any constitutional definition, some ambiguities are unavoidable when trying to define the press as meaning something other than everyone
or no one. The Constitution and the Court do not demand perfection. Even in
cases involving speech regulations, the Court has held that some imprecision is
“not fatal” and “that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements
229
of due process.”
Nonetheless, we are rightfully concerned about the harms of wrongfully
removing constitutionally valuable speech from the protection of the First
Amendment. We err on the side of overinclusiveness because the consequences
of that mistake—complete stifling of the speaker—are so serious. The Court
has noted that a wrongfully gagged speaker has little opportunity to convince
others of the error. When discussing bans on obscenity, Justice Brennan
explained that “one of the problems with erroneous determinations that prevent
marginal material from ever reaching the public is that such material, which is
by definition at the fringe of what is currently patently offensive to community
standards, will never be able to exert an influence on those inherently evolv230
ing standards.” The same risk is not present with the Press Clause. A speaker
who is wrongfully deemed not to be part of the press can use his or her freedoms
of speech to argue against that decision and ultimately to modify the definition.
Adopting a broad definition of the press, as attractive as the notion might
be, has failed to maximize the role of the press in promoting our democratic
values. The disappointing result of our attempts to overprotect with the Press
Clause has been to destroy it. Therefore, it is time to consider another approach
to defining the press that will revive the Press Clause and allow it to attain its
textual and functional potential.

media can do its important job effectively without resort to the commission of run-of-the-mill
torts.”). The Fourth Circuit’s approach, in my view, does not give sufficient weight to the
independent value of the Press Clause.
229.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
230.
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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A Workable Problem

Accepting that a narrower, and thus more meaningful, definition of the
press is desirable, the question remains whether it is attainable. Is there a way
to identify the press that would avoid the pitfalls of the overinclusive
approach while still avoiding constitutional concerns such as governmental
favoritism or content-based discrimination? Unlike others who have concluded
that the problems of this task are insurmountable, I contend that this is a
workable problem. While promulgating the ultimate definition is outside the
scope of this Article, the Court is capable of crafting a usable, albeit imperfect, definition that would adequately avoid constitutional violations such
as vagueness, overbreadth, or viewpoint discrimination. I further agree with
David Anderson that the definition need not arise overnight and may develop
231
progressively over time.
The first step to a workable definition is to accept that an identifiable
press exists and that it is more selective than the general public but not necessarily limited to traditional news outlets. While it certainly is true that many,
and perhaps even all, people act from time to time in ways that are somewhat
press-like, there are unquestionably people and entities who devote far more
time, experience, expertise, and resources to being the press as opposed to being
a regular participant in our public debate. These journalists are repeat players
232
who gather and disseminate news in a planned and consistent manner. Their
conspicuous presence as news providers, moreover, subjects them to the accountability of readers, viewers, listeners, and frequently to professional or industry
norms. This is the group who, by informing the public and checking the government, most fulfills the functional purpose of the press and therefore benefits
233
the public and our democracy.
Another commonality of the members of this press club is that they are
the people and entities most likely to utilize the rights and privileges of a
stronger, more robust reading of the Press Clause as imagined above in Part II.
Reasonable minds can debate how to define this group, and there will always

231.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15, at 52 (arguing “that the
courts should work out the contours of the constitutional concept of ‘press’ gradually, on a case-bycase basis, just as they do with other constitutional concepts such as ‘speech’ and ‘religion’”).
232.
See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 253.
233.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 442 (arguing that the use of the word
“press” in the First Amendment “implies the existence of something to which the collective singular can
be properly applied—an institution, or at least a shared mission or common undertaking”).
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be questions about the final membership list, but it does not change the
basic fact that the group exists. Identifying the press is hard and will require
hard choices, but it is possible. How do we know this? Because it is done in
this country every day and in every jurisdiction.
1.

Experimentation With Defining the Press

What few legal privileges the press does enjoy are almost entirely noncons235
titutional. Thanks to federal and state legislation, the press receives press
passes, press rooms, press galleries, press planes, press pools, and is often catered
236
to by a press office and press secretary. The press further owes lawmakers for
237
238
varied protections from newsroom searches and seizures, subpoenas, and
239
securities regulations. The press also has been granted preferential tax
240
241
242
policies, postal rates, and broadcasting licenses. While this is an impressive list of benefits, they vary by jurisdiction and are enjoyed by the press only
at the pleasure of the legislators, meaning that those who giveth can taketh
away. These legislatively granted privileges, therefore, do not resolve the issue

234.
Conversely, not all members of the “media” should necessarily be considered the “press”
despite the common practice of using the two words interchangeably. According to David Anderson:
Most of the media are in the business of entertainment, engaged in activities that have
little relation to the functions for which the law favors “the press.” The entertainment media
have no better claim than any other industry for special access to courtrooms or Congress,
or protection for confidential sources, or protection from discriminatory taxation.
Id.; see also Calvert, supra note 32, at 416 (observing that the line “between news and entertainment
rapidly is fading in the world of infotainment”).
235.
See, e.g., In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 472 n.9 (Mass. 1980) (noting that “the powerful
rostrum of a newsroom or a broadcast studio may confer status of a type that is both real and laden
with responsibility, but not, in [the Court’s] view, status of constitutional dimension”).
236.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 430 (“The press pass, the press
gallery, the press room, the press office, the press secretary (or public-information officer), the press bus
or plane, and the press pool are usually created by some form of law—statute, regulation, rule, or policy.”).
237.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2001).
238.
The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/item.php?pg=intro (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (noting
that “31 states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes—shield laws—that give journalists
some form of privilege against compelled production of confidential or unpublished information”).
239.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(ll), 80b-3(a) (2001).
240.
See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 495–505 & nn.368–439 (discussing
the Court’s treatment of differential tax policies for the press).
241.
39 C.F.R. pt. 3001, subpt. C, app. A, § 411.2 (1999).
242.
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 Fed. Comm. L.J. 1, 12
(1996) (“Two features of the new Act combine to grant virtually perpetual licenses to all radio and
television stations.”).
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of constitutional Press Clause rights. They do, however, highlight one
244
important fact—defining the press can be done. A quick review of legislative treatment of the press reveals a number of ways that lawmakers have
come up with to separate the press from everyone else. Many states incorporate
some combination of the following.
a.

Medium of Communication or News Affiliation

Laws often grant rights to the press by looking to the medium of communication. That is, only individuals or organizations that communicate to
the public via one of the listed media will qualify under these laws as members
of the press.
The most popular media listed in such laws include all or some combination of broadcast and cable television, journals, magazines, news agencies,
245
newspapers, periodicals, press associations, radio, and wire services. These
243.
While the Supreme Court has never attempted to define the press as a constitutional
matter, most lower federal courts have endorsed a test for determining who is eligible for a
constitutional reporter’s privilege. These courts have exploited the still unresolved ambiguity in the
Court’s Branzburg opinion over the existence of a constitutional reporter’s privilege by limiting that
holding to the specifics of the case. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir.
1998) (finding a scholar to be the press); In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (requiring
the party to be involved in “investigative reporting”); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that an investigative book author was the press); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811
F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that parties can claim a constitutional reporter’s privilege if they
establish “the intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to disseminate information to
the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process”); Apicela v.
McNeil Labs., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that a publisher of a technical
newsletter was the press); see also Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2006) (discussing the ambiguity in the Court’s opinion in Branzburg).
244.
David Anderson has suggested that the definition could be treated as a political question, at
least as to a reporter’s privilege to keep confidential sources, arguing that the only proper
constitutional question for the Court is not the scope of that protection, but rather “whether
compelled disclosure of sources abridges freedom of the press.” David A. Anderson, Confidential
Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 883 (2009).
245.
Amy Bauer, Note, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act
Needs a Specific Test for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 747, 747–48 (2009); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005) (applying the state
journalist’s privilege law to newspapers, radio broadcasting stations, or television stations); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to persons engaged in
newspaper, radio, or television); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005) (applying the state reporter’s
privilege to newspapers, periodicals, and radio stations); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2009)
(extending the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers or periodicals, wire services, radio or television
stations or networks, news or feature syndicates, or cable television); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30
(2010) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers, books, magazines, radio, or television
broadcasts); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006) (applying the state
reporter’s privilege to those persons gathering news who have been employed by newspapers, magazines,
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types of definitions are clearly aimed at identifying the more traditional news
media. A New Jersey court, for example, concluded that the state legislature
crafted its shield law with the goal of “protecting entities generally viewed as
246
part of the news gathering apparatus in the United States.”
One of the most obvious problems with this approach is that listing some
affiliations suggests that no others qualify and thus raises the risk of wrongfully
excluding a particular medium. It might also create new constitutional issues
247
of equal protection. In construing the Alabama shield law, for example, the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language applying the statute “to newspapers, radio broadcasting stations, or television stations” as not extending to
248
magazines. A similar concern is that constantly changing technology and
communication patterns could make the definition forever at risk of becoming outdated. The state shield laws, for example, often do not protect bloggers
because they do not include the internet on the explicit list of shielded media.
Indeed, it was not until 2007 that the first state, Washington, specifically applied
249
its journalist’s privilege law to information disseminated over the internet.

journals, press associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television, or any printed, photographic,
mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the public); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-902 (2009) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers, magazines, press
associations, news agencies, news services, radio stations, television stations, or community antenna
television services); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 218(2)(c) (McKinney 2005) (defining the news media as those
who will be allowed to cover court proceedings in an audiovisual manner, including those associated
with “television, radio, radio and television networks, news services, newspapers, magazines, trade
papers, in-house publications, professional journals or any other news reporting or news gathering
agency, the function of which is to inform the public, or some segment thereof”); see also CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to “[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or
other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or
employed . . . [or] a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or employed
by a radio or television station”).
246.
In re Napp Techs., Inc., 768 A.2d 274, 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000); see also N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21 (West 1994) (providing protection to a “person engaged on, engaged in,
connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of” newsgathering).
247.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that denying camera access amounted to an Equal Protection Clause violation).
248.
Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1335–43 (11th Cir. 2005).
249.
See Bauer, supra note 245, at 747; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West 2009)
(applying protections to any “newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire
service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite station or network, or audio or
audiovisual production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of news gathering and
disseminating news or information to the public by any means, including but not limited to, print,
broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution”).
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News-Related Activities

Another legislative approach to defining the press is to describe news250
related activities such as gathering, writing, and disseminating the news.
These statutes extend protection to individuals and organizations “based
251
on the newsgathering function, not the news gatherer’s media affiliation.”
A prime example can be found in Minnesota’s journalist shield law. The
statute extends its protections to any “person who is or has been directly
engaged in gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information
252
for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public.”
253
The federal Freedom of Information Act provides a similar broad, functional definition of the press in the context of providing the press with
reduced fees associated with document requests. According to the Act, “‘representative of the news media’ means any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills
to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to
254
an audience.” Some of these activity-based definitions focus on the intent of
the party. A federal court interpreting New York’s shield law concluded that
250.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4701 (LexisNexis 2001) (including within its press definition “any
printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the
public”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20146 (2007) (covering any person who is “engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating
news or other information to the public”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.129(B)(2)(b) (West Supp.
2010) (defining journalist as a person connected with any news medium, including newspapers,
magazines, press associations, news agencies, wire services, radio or television stations, or “a similar
medium, for the purpose of gathering, processing, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating
information for the general public”); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510 (2009) (including those engaged in
any medium of communication to the public); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000) (“A person
engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast connected with or employed by the
news media or press, or who is independently engaged in gathering information for publication or
broadcast, shall not be required . . . to disclose . . . any information or the source of any information
procured for publication or broadcast.”); see also People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 654 (Ct. App.
2005) (interpreting California law and finding that “to qualify for the shield law protection, the
newsperson must show that he is one of the types of persons enumerated in the law, that the information
was obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public, and that the information has not been disseminated to the public by the person from
whom disclosure is sought” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
251.
Bauer, supra note 245, at 757 n.65. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767A.6 (West
2000) (“A reporter or other person who is involved in gathering or preparation of news for broadcast
or publication.”).
252.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West 2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2009)
(shielding those “engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing,
recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium”).
253.
5 U.S.C § 552 (2006).
254.
5 U.S.C. § 552(4)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. 2009).
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would-be journalists must show that they engaged in the information
gathering “with the intent of using the information collected, at least in part,
255
to publish a report that would be widely and publicly circulated.”
This approach avoids some of the pitfalls of the definition-by-affiliation
approach discussed above. Most notably, it gives room for technology to change
by focusing on the core activity at issue. This approach is also more egalitarian
because it treats “the occasional pamphleteer precisely the same as the regu256
257
larly employed journalist” and leaves room to include internet newspersons.
At the same time, though, the broad definition raises the risk of redundancy
258
between the Press Clause and the Speech Clause.
c. Circulation or Regularity of Publication
Still other statutes provide definitions of the press that demand a minimum
circulation or regularity of publication. One example of a statute with these
requirements is Illinois’s journalist shield law, which defines “news medium”
as “any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals . . . and
259
The Indiana reporter’s privilege statute
having a general circulation.”
contains similar requirements in that it covers persons connected with or
employed by “a newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals and
260
having a general circulation.”

255.
Schiller v. New York, 245 F.R.D. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Likely the only other
reported case that interprets the New York shield law’s definitions clause is from the Superior Court
of New Jersey. Trump v. O’Brien, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008) (holding that an
author who gathered news sources for publication in his book qualified as a professional journalist
under New York law).
256.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 581.
257.
Bauer, supra note 245, at 747. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72,
106 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that bloggers are within protected class of California shield law).
258.
See supra Part III.B.1.
259.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 8-902 (West 2003). In a case seeking to define “news
media” for the purposes of a public disclosure bar to claims under the Illinois Whistleblower Act, an
Illinois appellate court noted that the state legislature had not defined “news media” for purposes of
the Whistleblower Act before borrowing and applying the legislature’s statutory definition of “news
media” in the state’s reporter’s privilege law. State ex rel. Beeler v. Target Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1096,
1104–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
260.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 2008); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5492
(West 2000) (“No person engaged in, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general
circulation.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 (1997) (defining “newspaper” and “periodical” to mean only
publications issued at regular intervals and with paid circulation and explicitly stating that the
definition applies to those gathering or presenting news for any accredited newspaper).
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Similarly, the federal code section regulating prison inmate mail correspondence allows inmates to write to news media and representatives of
261
the media to initiate correspondence. That regulation explicitly applies only
to newspapers circulating among the general public and publishing news of
general character or interest; news magazines with national circulation sold
by newsstands and mail subscription to the general public; national or
international news services; and radio or television programs with the pri262
mary purpose of reporting the news and holding FCC licenses.
This approach to defining the press exemplifies an attempt to distinguish between repeat journalists with an established audience and the occasional public commentator. The idea behind these statutory definitions is that
not just anyone should be able to claim status as a journalist and receive legal
rights or protections. A benefit of this approach is that someone who is not associated with an established media outlet—the bedroom blogger, for example—
may gain recognition as a member of the press over time if she publishes
regularly and builds a consistent audience.
d.

Wage Earning or Livelihood

Finally, some legislation requires that to receive protection as a member of the press, the individual must be employed as a professional journalist
or earn his or her livelihood in the capacity of a reporter.
Delaware’s reporter shield law, for example provides protections in
cases in which the individual is “earning his or her principal livelihood” from
263
newsgathering. In the alternative, if a person does not earn his or her principal livelihood from journalism, the Delaware scheme offers protection to
individuals who worked as a reporter for at least twenty hours in the three
264
weeks prior or four of the previous eight weeks. Along the same lines, other
statutes extend legal protections or rights only to “professional journalists.”
For example, Florida’s journalist’s privilege law only addresses “professional
[j]ournalists,” defined as persons who regularly engage in newsgathering
activity for gain or for livelihood while working as salaried employees or
265
independent contractors.
261.
28 C.F.R. § 540.2 (2009).
262.
Id.
263.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320 (1999).
264.
Id.
265.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999); see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 1999) (extending coverage to any “professional journalist,” which it defines as a person
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A provision in the Code of Federal Regulations providing an exception
to prohibited travel-related transactions in Iraq for news-reporting activities
266
sets forth similar “professionalism” requirements. According to the regulation, transactions in Iraq by “persons regularly employed in journalistic activity
267
by recognized newsgathering organizations” are not prohibited.
This is yet another attempt to separate the repeat journalist from the occasional contributor to the public debate. Unlike the circulation or regularity of
publication criteria, however, the wage-earning or livelihood requirement
does not allow an amateur or unaffiliated would-be journalist to earn a press
credential simply by being a consistent publisher and building an audience.
2.

The Unique Functions of the Press qua Press

There is no dispute that the search for a workable definition of the press is
filled with minefields. But unless some distinguishing criteria are adopted
and some expressive activity excluded, our press rights will be nothing but
a reiteration of our speech rights. Accepting that limiting factors must be
chosen, however, raises the risk that certain speakers and messages will
be excluded not for constitutionally significant reasons, but because they are
disfavored by a governmental entity or the public generally. The challenge
is to find a definition that is narrow enough to be distinct yet broad enough to
be fair. The opposite approach—the one the Supreme Court is now
taking—of not defining the press at all is unacceptable because it eliminates
entirely the First Amendment’s separate press freedoms.
My goal with this Article has been to expose the problems with the
current approach, to highlight the net loss of constitutional freedoms it has
engendered, and to urge an embrace of press exceptionalism recognized
through a narrow definition of the press. I make no pretense of settling the definitional question, and I will address this question more fully in a future article.
But as an offering of preliminary thoughts, I suggest that the most promising
avenue is to focus on the unique functions of the press qua press.
Because the inherent value of the Press Clause arises out of its separate
role from the Speech Clause, I propose that this is where the focus belongs.
Thus, by examining those functions that a free press fulfills in our
democracy that are different from the values served by our speech freedoms,
“who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming,
taping or photographing of news intended for” various news media).
266.
31 C.F.R. § 575.207 (2008).
267.
Id. § 575.416.
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we can close in on a meaningful definition. Defining the press through the
lens of its unique functions has the primary benefit of ensuring that we
avoid the redundancy problem. It does so by necessarily excluding a view of
the Press Clause as guaranteeing that “all individuals have a right to
268
Because the
disseminate their viewpoints for general consideration.”
Speech Clause already protects the individual right to disseminate
messages, this definition would not address any of the unique functions of
the Press Clause.
The unique-functions approach further avoids the troublesome dichotomy of having to choose between a definition that is too elitist and one
that is too inclusive. Many scholars have tended toward a broad definition
269
of the press in which everyone is or easily can be a journalist. They elect
an overinclusive approach in part to avoid the criticism that a narrower
270
definition establishes an “elite, protected class.” In addition to creating the
redundancy problem, this dichotomy does not allow us to recognize and
protect those who have specialized abilities and resources for newsgathering
as well as a proven commitment to news dissemination. Thus, the “genuine
difficulty” in crafting a definition, Floyd Abrams has argued, has “deter[red] us
271
from affording protection to those who are plainly entitled to it.”
Through a proper analysis of the unique functions of the press qua press,
the Court can identify characteristics that avoid the disconcerting conformity and favoritism of the elite while still allowing us to recognize and benefit
from the press’s knowledge, skills, and dedication. A unique-functions approach
allows the Court to embrace all the advantages of the egalitarian definition
by crafting a definition of the press in which not everyone is a member, but
everyone has the equal potential of becoming a member.
So what are the unique functions of the press? I suggest that the press fills
two primary roles that go beyond the values served by our basic free speech
rights. The first is that the press gathers and conveys information to the public
about newsworthy matters; and the second is that the press serves as a check
268.
See Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE PRESSES,
supra note 32, at 1, 8.
269.
See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 247 (identifying the “egalitarian
model . . . in which all citizens are equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering
watchdogs”).
270.
Calvert, supra note 32, at 413 (1999); Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 246–47
(identifying the “expert model, in which journalists are conceived of as a uniquely qualified and
clearly identifiable collection of professionals who serve as agents of the public in the procurement
and dissemination of news”).
271.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 580.
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on the government by conveying information to the voters about “what [their]
272
Government is up to.” Both of these functions have been recognized by the
Court yet have never been given significance in terms of constitutional protections. A definitional analysis thus can build on these functions as a method
of pinpointing the people or entities that most fulfill these roles. We can look,
moreover, to legislative experimentation with defining the press as a starting
point by asking which, if any, of these definitions best captures the special role
of the press. Under any definitional scheme, of course, the courts must continually patrol for signs of content-based or viewpoint-based discrimination.

CONCLUSION
Few constitutional provisions have been given as little practical weight
as the Free Press Clause. Despite an explicit textual directive, the Press Clause
has been interpreted to mean nothing more than the freedom to publish or
disseminate individual speech—a right that is of dubious value considering that
the Speech Clause protects these same freedoms. The result is a constitutional
regime in which the Press Clause has been relegated to a mere redundancy.
Even those who interpret the constitutional text and history as giving
the clause more significance, however, have considered the definitional problem an insurmountable roadblock. The ubiquitous acceptance today of the
need for a constitutionally overprotective approach to the Press Clause—as is
the practice with the Speech Clause—makes it impossible to define the press in
a meaningful way. To rouse the Press Clause from its slumber, it is necessary
to reject an overprotective approach and to embrace a narrow definition that
separates a member of the press from an occasional public commentator. The
constitutional fallback protections, meanwhile, ensure that the marketplace
of ideas is vibrant. The Press Clause needs a distinct definition to truly fulfill
its unique functions in our society and our democracy.
The Constitution gives the press explicit protection. It does so because
the press has always played an exceptional and important role in our society
and our democracy. It is up to us to recognize, honor, and protect that unique
role. We should no longer fear press exceptionalism. The press is not everyone;
everyone is not the press.

272.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role as a
check on government abuse.”).

